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1 Introduction
This article examines the current strengths and
remaining sources of vulnerability in Malaysia as well
as the challenges for the future. It shows that the
recovery in the Malaysian economy since 1998 has
been due mainly to exports, resilient private
consumption, and a boost in public spending, amid
lower investment level. GDP growth is at present at
a more moderate level of around 5–6 per cent,
thereby reducing concerns of overheating, which
was a main issue during the crisis. The article argues
that Malaysia is unlikely to return to the rapid growth
of over 9.0 per cent, as in the pre-crisis period, given
the changing and more challenging global economic
landscape. The increasing global competition is
making it more difficult to attract FDI and expand
the export markets.
The article shows that the financial sector has
become more resilient following the bank mergers
and the reform measures, including better risk
management practices. Like other Asian countries,
Malaysia has accumulated high levels of foreign
reserves, which has reduced the country’s vulnerability
to speculative behaviour by international investors.
However, an important source of vulnerability
remains on the trade side. The country’s trade pattern
has changed slowly, with exports still fairly
concentrated on electronics products. In terms of
main trade partners, Malaysia has grown less sensitive
to the USA and more sensitive to East Asia, especially
China, in recent times. But given its high dependency
on trade and the large trade flows between the USA
and China, any significant slowdown in the US
economy could hit Malaysia in a major way, despite
recent diversification in its main export markets.
The article is divided in six sections. Following this
introduction, Section 2 describes growth and
external sector performance in Malaysia. Section 3
discusses the reforms in the financial sector, and
Section 4 the recent trends in capital flows and
developments in the capital account. Section 5
discusses vulnerabilities originating from internal
imbalances, while Section 6 concludes and offers
policy suggestions for reducing vulnerability.
2 Growth performance, dynamism of exports,
trade surplus and saving rates
The Malaysian economy grew at a moderate pace of
5.4 per cent during the period 1999–2005, following
a steep 7.4 per cent contraction in GDP growth in
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Table 1 Unemployment rate in crisis-hit countries (%)
(%) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Indonesia 4.7 5.5 6.4 6.1 8.1 9.1 9.6 9.9 10.3
Malaysia 2.4 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5
Philippines 7.9 9.6 9.4 10.1 11.1 11.4 11.3 11.8 11.4
Korea 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1 3.8 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.7
Thailand 0.9 3.4 3.0 2.4 3.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.4
Source Asian Development Bank (ADB).
1998. The growth recovery was quite bumpy as the
Malaysian economy was affected by the collapse of
the internet bubble in 2001. GDP growth was
almost flat at 0.3 per cent in 2001, but growth
rebounded thereafter when the downturn stabilised
and the electronics sector recovered. From 2002–5,
economic growth averaged at about 5.6 per cent,
which paled in comparison to the average of more
than 9.0 per cent prior to the crisis. A major reason
behind the slower GDP growth was the slack in
investment activity, as the private sector had gone
through painful restructuring phases after the crisis. It
was only in 2003 that private investment started
regaining some strength. Even with the crisis,
Malaysia’s unemployment rate has remained low
compared with its neighbours (Table 1), due to the
already tight labour market prior to the crisis. The
manufacturing and services sectors have been the
key drivers of growth after the crisis (Table 2).
The recovery in the Malaysian economy since 1998
was generally attributed to the recovery in exports,
resilient private consumption and a boost in public
spending (Table 3). As a major exporter in electronics
products, the rise in the demand for microchips and
IT products has boosted Malaysia’s exports of
electronics. Since more than 50 per cent of
Malaysia’s exports are made-up of electronics
products, total export growth has also exhibited fast
growth. As a result of a weaker ringgit exchange
rate, which plunged by more than 40 per cent
against the US dollar in 1998, exporters of primary
commodities such as petroleum, gas and palm oil
have gained significantly in local currency from their
US dollar export earnings.
The 1998 crisis saw many companies closing down or
having to restructure their operations by disposing of
their non-core activities and cutting the workforce.
The crisis also revealed the over-exposure of
investment in some sectors such as construction in
office buildings and residential properties. Private
investment has since dropped to about half the pre-
crisis level relative to GDP, while public investment’s
share has increased due to the fiscal stimulus to
revive the economy (Table 3). It appears that the
current investment level is adequate to generate
moderate growth of around 5–6 per cent, which is
nearer to Malaysia’s potential growth path and is
more sustainable.
2.1 Sustainability of FDI
Owing to the rising competition from China and
India, there are concerns over the sustainability of
the foreign investment level. The corporate tax rate
will be reduced by one percentage point per year in
Kadir The Malaysian Economy: Vulnerability to Crises60
Table 2 Malaysia: GDP growth by sector (%, 1987 constant price)
% change 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Agriculture 4.5 0.7 –2.8 0.5 6.1 –0.6 2.8 5.5 5.0 2.5
Mining 2.9 1.9 0.4 6.9 0.3 –1.5 4.3 5.8 3.9 0.8
Manufacturing 18.2 10.1 –13.4 11.7 18.3 –5.9 4.3 8.6 9.8 5.1
Construction 16.2 10.6 –24 –4.4 0.6 2.1 2.0 1.5 –1.5 –1.6
Services 8.9 9.9 –0.4 4.5 6.7 6.0 6.5 4.7 7.0 6.5
Electricity, gas and water 9.6 –5.8 11.1 4.9 16.9 3.5 5.9 5.7 7.3 5.6
Transport and communication 7.4 11.8 –0.3 4.3 9.8 8.3 4.1 5.3 8.4 6.2
Wholesale and retail trade 7.9 8.0 –3.4 3.1 5.9 2.5 2.6 1.5 7.2 8.0
Finance and business services 17.0 18.9 –1.9 5.9 7.1 9.5 14.2 6.3 7.0 5.7
Government services 1.7 8.6 1.1 6.6 2.0 4.6 5.3 8.0 6.9 7.6
Other services 7.9 7.0 1.9 2.7 4.0 6.9 4.3 3.3 4.9 4.9
Real GDP growth 10.0 7.3 –7.4 6.1 8.9 0.3 4.4 5.5 7.2 5.2
Source Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
2007 and 2008, to 26 per cent, as a measure to
enhance Malaysia’s attractiveness to foreign direct
investment (FDI). The government is taking measures
to diversify the economy further and promote new
investments in sectors that have good growth
prospects, such as ‘halal’ food products, bio-tech, IT
services and Islamic finance. Recent initiatives to
attract foreign investment include allowing a 49 per
cent foreign equity stake in Islamic banks and
removing limits on foreign property loans. In a major
development project in southern Johor, a southern
Malaysian state bordering Singapore, foreign firms
are allowed 100 per cent ownership in selected
services sectors, are given freehand to seek global
financing and hire foreign workers. Though confined
to a limited area, this is seen as an unprecedented
bold move to tempt foreign investors.
During the period 2000–5, the Malaysian economy
grew by 5.2 per cent (Table 4). According to the
government’s five-year plan report, the latest being
the Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) report covering the
period 2006–10 (Economic Planning Unit 2006), the
Malaysian economy is targeted to grow at an average
rate of 6.0 per annum. This medium-term growth is
based on estimates derived from a Cobb–Douglas
production function. The respective contributions of
major factors, essentially labour, capital and total
factor productivity (TFP) are worked out. If efforts to
raise TFP through human capital development and
R&D activities do not materialise, the GDP growth
rate could be lower than expected.
The 9MP aims to raise the value-added content of the
economy while not forgetting the socioeconomic
programmes to lift the quality of life of Malaysians. The
private finance initiatives (PFI) announced in the 9MP
will provide opportunities for the private sector to
participate in development projects. The 9MP is seen as
the ‘National Mission’ that will provide the framework
for the nation’s development policies in the next
15 years, to meet the goals of Vision 2020. Another
major development plan that was unveiled to chart the
course of the Malaysian economy over the medium and
long-term is the Third Industrial Master Plan (IMP3)
2006–20. It presents strategic directions in enhancing
the competitiveness of the manufacturing and services
sectors under a backdrop of an increasingly competitive
global landscape. It is critical that the plans are
effectively implemented to meet the growth target,
barring major disruptions from abroad.
The private sector will continue to be the key driver
to Malaysia’s growth, with the public sector
complementing and facilitating the process. A recent
news article reported that the government had
spent more than RM11 billion to take over or rescue
seven ailing privatised projects in the past five years
(New Straits Times, 14 December 2006). These failed
projects are mainly infrastructure projects that will
only generate returns over the long term. This affair
also suggests that the private sector is still not totally
healed as it struggles to get rid of debts and in
extreme cases, is bailed out by the government. Due
to budget limitations, the government can only
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Table 3 Malaysia: Expenditure share to GDP (%, 1987 constant price)
% of GDP 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Final consumption expenditure 59.2 57.6 56.0 55.8 56.6 59.5 60.3 61.6 62.9 64.8
Private sector 47.8 46.5 45.0 43.6 45.3 46.2 46.3 46.8 48.2 50.1
Public sector 11.4 11.2 11.0 12.1 11.3 13.3 14.0 14.8 14.7 14.7
Gross fixed capital formation 48.4 49.2 30.3 26.7 30.8 29.8 28.7 27.9 26.9 26.8
Private sector 35.6 36.3 17.5 12.7 15.5 12.4 10.1 9.6 11.6 12.0
Public sector 12.8 12.9 12.7 14.0 15.3 17.5 18.6 18.4 15.2 14.8
Exports of goods and services 96.5 94.8 102.8 109.6 116.9 107.8 107.9 108.2 117.3 121.2
Imports of goods and services 102.9 101.5 89.0 92.7 105.9 96.5 98.4 97.2 109.4 112.4
Net export –6.5 –6.7 13.8 16.9 11.0 11.3 9.6 11.0 7.9 8.8
Source Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
salvage projects of public interest that are still viable
under proper management. To foster and facilitate
private sector growth, measures adopted have
included improving the government delivery system,
giving tax incentives, modernising the agriculture
sector, identifying and promoting new sources of
growth, and uplifting the quality of human capital. In
addition, the government has initiated the National
Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Development
Blueprint, which has outlined the objectives,
strategies and action plans to accelerate the
development of the SMEs in the country.
2.2 Strong reliance on foreign trade
The Malaysian economy is highly dependent on trade,
with trade-to-GDP ratio reaching about 200 per cent
since the late 1990s. This means that the economy
remains vulnerable to the global business cycle,
particularly the growth performance in developed
countries that are Malaysia’s main export markets. The
traditional top four major markets for Malaysia’s
exports in 2005 were USA (19.7 per cent), Europe (11.7
per cent), Japan (9.4 per cent) and Singapore (15.6 per
cent). Exports to Singapore are not all meant for the
local market and could possibly reach other developed
countries as their final destinations. China and India are
increasingly becoming important export markets for
Malaysia. China’s share has increased from 2.4 per cent
in 1996 to 6.6 per cent in 2005, as a result of an
average export growth of 25.0 per cent per year to
China (Table 6). Over time, Malaysia’s direction of
exports has not structurally changed much in terms of
shares, except for a few notable countries such as
China and India.
Manufactured exports continue to be Malaysia’s main
export item. The large share of electrical and
electronics (E&E) products at 53.0 per cent of total
exports in 2005 (Table 5) is a source of vulnerability
to export performance and economic growth.
Export growth is significantly affected by the
movements in the global electronics cycle. This was
seen in 2001 when the internet market crashed,
which resulted in total exports falling by 10.6 per
cent. Imports fell by 10.3 per cent because a large
share of imports was intermediate inputs for the
E&E sector. Nonetheless, some export diversification
has taken place, with agriculture and mining making
up 7.0 per cent and 9.8 per cent of exports in 2005,
respectively, thus partly compensating for
weaknesses arising from a down-cycle in electronics.
Resource-based industries such as rubber and
petroleum products industries can also provide a
cushion to the economy when the electronics sector
turns unfavourable. On account of higher oil and gas
prices, the share of mining in exports increased from
6.4 per cent in 1996 to 9.8 per cent in 2005.
Direction of exports
The standard policy instruments in dealing with an
external slowdown are mainly through the
coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. A fiscal
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Table 4 Malaysia: GDP growth by expenditure (%, 1987 constant price)
% change 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Final consumption expenditure 5.6 4.6 –10.0 5.7 10.5 5.4 5.8 7.7 9.5 8.3
Private sector 6.9 4.3 –10.2 2.9 13.0 2.4 4.4 6.6 10.5 9.2
Public sector 0.7 5.7 –8.9 17.1 1.6 17.3 10.4 11.4 6.2 5.4
Gross fixed capital formation 8.2 9.2 –43.0 –6.5 25.7 –2.8 0.3 2.7 3.1 4.7
Private sector 11.3 9.4 –55.2 –23.1 32.6 –19.9 –15.1 0.4 30.2 8.5
Public sector 0.5 8.4 –8.4 16.3 19.4 14.5 11.2 3.9 –11.0 1.9
Exports of goods and services 9.2 5.5 0.5 13.2 16.1 –7.5 4.5 5.7 16.3 8.6
Imports of goods and services 4.9 5.8 –18.8 10.6 24.4 –8.6 6.3 4.2 20.7 8.0
Net Export –34.1 10.8 –291.6 29.9 –29.5 3.1 –11.4 20.7 –22.4 16.7
Real GDP growth 10.0 7.3 –7.4 6.1 8.9 0.3 4.4 5.5 7.2 5.2
Source Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
stimulus package, which mainly involves public works
projects, is implemented to stabilise the economy
during periods of weak external demand. This step
could also be taken when the private sector is under-
performing. The problem is that public projects may
require time to be effective due to problems and
delays in land acquisition and the tendering process.
Recognising the slow pace of projects taking off, the
government has stepped up efforts to improve its
delivery system. Payments are to be made soon after
the completion of projects.
Export composition
In fact, the federal government has had budget
deficits since the 1998 crisis, but it has narrowed
them due to consolidation measures undertaken.
According to the Ministry of Finance (2006), the
fiscal deficit reached a high of 5.7 per cent of GDP in
1999, but it declined to 3.8 per cent of GDP in
2005, thanks to higher revenue amid moderate
spending. The fiscal deficit is estimated to have
declined further to 3.5 per cent in 2006, a level that
will foster economic growth without imposing
strains on the government’s budget. The conduct of
monetary policy will balance the need to contain
inflation, while providing a conducive environment
for growth. Interest rates have been close to
historical lows to encourage private consumption and
investment activities, but had increased recently due
to rising inflationary pressures.
With measures taken to reform the banking system,
restructure bad debts, contain non-performing loans
(NPLs) and instil better credit management practices,
banks are now operating on a more solid footing
(IMF 2001). Largely due to measures taken during the
crisis period, the ratio of NPLs to total loans fell from
13.6 per cent in 1998 to about 5.8 per cent in 2005
(see Table 9). Bank Negara, the central bank, has
encouraged bank mergers, and these have largely
been market-driven, although the central bank has
intervened at times to kick-start the negotiation
process and to ensure it proceeds smoothly.
There are rising concerns that the household debt
level has been increasing over the years. Although
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Table 5 Export composition
Exports (1996) Exports (2005) Average 
RM million % share RM million % share % growth
Manufactured 158,435 80.5 429,873 80.5 11.7
of which:
Electrical and electronics 104,191 53.0 282,779 53.0 11.7
Electronics 35,233 17.9 208,232 39.0 21.8
Electrical 68,958 35.1 74,547 14.0 0.9
Chemicals 6,773 3.4 29,718 5.6 17.9
Metal products 4,995 2.5 17,157 3.2 14.7
Optical and science eqpt. 3,119 1.6 12,318 2.3 16.5
Textiles and footwear 6,906 3.5 10,520 2.0 4.8
Agriculture commodities 21,892 11.1 37,421 7.0 6.1
of which:
Palm oil 3,510 1.8 19,036 3.6 20.7
Rubber 2,282 1.2 5,787 1.1 10.9
Sawn timber 3,039 1.5 4,051 0.8 3.2
Minerals 12,597 6.4 52,321 9.8 17.1
of which:
Crude oil 7,212 3.7 28,508 5.3 16.5
Liquefied natural gas 4,458 2.3 20,790 3.9 18.7
Total exports 196,692 100.0 533,788 100.0 11.7
Source Bank Negara Annual Report (1996 and 2005).
not reaching an alarming level yet, housing debt
levels, as measured by household loans to GDP, has
risen to 61.5 per cent in 2005 from 45.3 per cent in
2000. In 2006 household finance was hit hard by
the rise in interest rates, an 18 per cent increase in
petrol prices, and a 15 per cent hike in electricity
rates, not to mention the rise in water tariff rates.
Beginning in January 2007, there will be an
increase ranging from 25–60 per cent in toll rates
for five highways, which could impact on inflation
and dampen consumer sentiment. Due to the rise
in the cost of living, a moderation in the economy
and modest income growth, the NPL ratio in the
household sector could creep up. According to the
Bank Negara Annual Report 2005, the NPL ratios
for households in 2005 was at 7.5 per cent (2004:
7.6 per cent), while for the business enterprises, the
corresponding ratio was 11.2 per cent in 2005
(2004: 13.7 per cent). With the NPL ratios trending
much lower in 2005 compared with the 1998
crisis-period, the financial sector is on a better
foundation and is more resilient to face a
slowdown in growth.
2.3 High level of reserves
Malaysia’s foreign reserves have increased favourably
since the crisis, from US$25 billion in 1998 to US$70.5
billion in 2005 (Table 7), reaching US$86.9 billion in
February 2007 (Bank Negara Malaysia, MSB). The
latest level of foreign reserves is sufficient to finance
8.1 months of retained imports and is 9.1 times the
short-term external debt. The sizeable trade surplus, at
25.4 per cent of GDP in 2005, and continued inflows
of FDI, have more than offset outflows and
contributed to the rise in foreign reserves since the
crisis. Although portfolio flows have been volatile at
times, the persistently large trade surpluses have acted
as a buffer against reversals in portfolio flows. The
accumulation of foreign reserves has stemmed from
the favourable trade surplus, but one explanation that
also applies to Malaysia is that the level of investment
has been reduced significantly relative to savings. This
has resulted in a large resource surplus arising from the
saving-investment gap (Table 8).
Bank Negara has said little on the actual level of
foreign reserves, except to say that reserves are
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Table 6 Direction of exports
Exports (1996) Exports (2005) Average 
RM million % share RM million % share % growth
ASEAN countries 55,414 28.2 139,208 26.1 10.8
Singapore 40,289 20.5 83,333 15.6 8.4
Thailand 8,069 4.1 28,723 5.4 15.2
Indonesia 3,065 1.6 12,580 2.4 17.0
Philippines 2,360 1.2 7,476 1.4 13.7
Other ASEAN 1,631 0.8 7,096 1.3 17.7
Selected North East Asia 30,395 15.5 99,184 18.6 14.0
China 4,734 2.4 35,221 6.6 25.0
Korea 5,999 3.0 17,945 3.4 12.9
European Union (EU) 26,984 13.7 62,629 11.7 9.8
USA 35,821 18.2 105,033 19.7 12.7
Japan 26,378 13.4 49,918 9.4 7.3
India 3,033 1.5 14,972 2.8 19.4
Australia 3,059 1.6 18,042 3.4 21.8
Rest of the world 15,608 7.9 44,801 8.4 12.4
Total 196,692 100.0 533,788 100.0 11.7
Source Bank Negara Annual Report (1996 and 2005).
unencumbered and usable. As with other crisis-hit
countries, Malaysia has the tendency to accumulate
reserves as a precautionary stance to ward off
excessive speculation. Bank Negara is no exception in
wanting to increase reserves in the hope of reducing
the risk and vulnerability to speculative attacks,
namely to serve as an added security measure. There
appears to be no optimum level of reserves, if
China’s or other East Asian countries’ experiences
are indicative. It seems that the more reserves you
have the better.
However, there are some potential costs involved
in maintaining a high level of reserves. One way of
looking at costs is to compare the returns from
reserve management relative to interest payments
on external debts. If the reserves are invested in
low-yielding assets, while interests on foreign debt
are higher, then there will be costs in retaining high
reserves. In Malaysia’s case, although information is
scarce, it is likely that some costs are involved. It is
reported that most of the reserves are held in
sovereign and quasi-sovereign papers of high
investment grade as well as in foreign currency
deposits, but detailed data is not available. It is
expected that there is a modest cost in view of the
negative differential between returns on reserves
and debt interest charges. About 78.7 per cent of
foreign debt in 2006 was in US dollars, with 11.7
per cent in yen.
The cost of sterilising liquidity in Malaysia’s case is still
manageable. The interest rates are still relatively low
and inflation is under control, and Bank Negara still
has the capacity to sterilise excessive inflows and to
manage liquidity. The yield for the one-year Bank
Negara bill was at 2.52 per cent in 2005, and the
five-year Malaysian Government Securities had a
yield of 3.73 per cent. The benefits of sterilising
appear to outweigh the costs. Allowing too much
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Table 7 Balance of payments and foreign reserves
% of GDP 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Goods balance 4.0 3.6 24.4 28.6 23.1 20.9 19.9 24.7 23.2 25.4
Current account –4.4 –5.9 13.2 15.9 9.4 8.3 8.4 12.8 12.6 15.3
Financial account (net) 6.9 2.0 0.7 –8.4 –6.9 –4.4 –3.3 –3.1 3.7 –7.5
FDI 5.0 5.1 3.0 3.1 2.0 0.3 1.4 1.1 2.2 0.8
Non-FDI 1.9 –3.1 –2.3 –11.5 –8.9 –4.7 –4.7 –4.1 1.6 –8.2
Overall balance 2.5 –3.9 13.9 7.6 2.4 3.9 5.1 9.7 16.3 7.8
Foreign reserves (US$ billion) 27.0 20.8 25.6 30.9 29.9 29.9 33.7 44.2 66.2 70.5
Months of imports 4.4 3.4 5.7 5.9 4.5 5.1 5.4 6.6 7.9 7.8
As ratio of short-term debt 2.8 1.4 2.8 5.2 6.2 4.7 3.9 5.0 5.8 5.7
Source Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
Table 8 Savings and investment (% of GDP)
% of GDP 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total consumption 59.9 59.3 54.3 56.5 57.6 62.5 62.0 61.0 59.2 59.4
Gross national savings 38.9 39.1 42.2 41.2 40.1 34.9 34.8 36.5 37.3 37.0
Gross capital formation 43.5 45.4 28.2 24.1 29.8 25.9 25.8 22.9 24.1 20.9
Savings–Investment gap –4.6 –6.3 14.0 17.1 10.3 9.0 9.0 13.6 13.3 16.1
Source Department of Statistics, Malaysia
liquidity in the system could lead to imprudent
lending by banks or even asset price inflation, as seen
prior to the crisis. This could also lead to the
strengthening of the ringgit at an unfavourable rate
that could affect export competitiveness.
Bank Negara does not disclose the composition of
foreign reserves to the public. Since most of the
trade activities are done in US dollars, it is believed
that the main reserve currency is the US dollar. With
the US dollar weakening against the euro in late
2006, diversifying the reserve composition to euros
or other stable currencies could reduce further losses
from currency movements. Weighed down by the
large and unsustainable US current account deficit,
the US dollar is expected to depreciate further over
the medium term. The slower growth in the US
economy could pressure the dollar to ease further.
After the lifting of the fixed exchange rate of the
ringgit on 21 July 2005 to a managed floating regime,
the ringgit has appreciated gradually against the US
dollar. The ringgit has strengthened by about 7.0 per
cent against the US dollar in 2006. The nominal
effective exchange rate (NEER) was quite stable in
2006, inching up by 0.7 per cent. The stronger ringgit
was also attributed to renewed foreign interests in the
local stock market, as they can simultaneously gain
from both the rise in equity prices and a stronger
currency. The ringgit is still trailing regional currencies
as the latter strengthened even more against the US
dollar. Preferably, a gradual appreciation of the ringgit
would give time for businesses to adjust to a stronger
currency. Although exports might be affected
somewhat, cheaper imports of raw inputs and
machinery could offset some of the pressures on
export prices and domestic inflation.
At the regional level, Malaysia is a member of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and is involved in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
which has set up a ‘collective fund’ that member
countries can seek assistance from. The CMI is
intended to address short-term liquidity problems
and complements international financial facilities.
Malaysia has a financial commitment of US$300
million in the move to raise the funds of the ASEAN
Swap Arrangement (ASA) to US$2 billion. However,
the amount allocated may not be large enough to
handle crises of larger proportions.
3 The financial sector
The banking sector has gone through fairly extensive
restructuring exercises since the 1998 crisis. Banks
are healthier, while the soundness of balance sheets
has improved after bad loans were taken over by the
special purpose vehicle (SPV), Danaharta. Banks
started to lend again after disposing of their NPLs.
Created during the turmoil of the crisis, Dahanarta
wound-up its operation at the end of 2005, after
fulfilling its objective of addressing NPL problems in
the banking sector. Danaharta had effectively
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Table 9 Financial sector and related indicators
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
RM/US$ exchange rate 2.52 2.81 3.92 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.79
Change in CPI % 3.3 2.7 5.3 2.8 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.2 1.4 3.0
7-day interbank rate % 6.98 7.61 8.46 3.38 2.66 2.79 2.73 2.74 2.7 2.72
3-month FD rate % 7.21 9.06 5.83 3.33 3.48 3.21 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.02
Average lending rate % 10.12 11.51 9.72 7.75 7.46 6.67 6.51 6.11 5.98 6.12
Bank loan growth % 28.6 26.6 –1.7 –5.3 5.4 3.9 4.6 4.8 8.5 8.6
Loan/GDP ratio % 132.1 150.6 147.2 131.4 121.3 129.3 124.9 119.9 114.2 112.7
NPL ratio (3-month) % N/A N/A 13.6 11.0 9.7 11.5 10.2 8.9 7.5 5.8
NPL ratio (6-month) % 3.7 4.1 8.0 6.4 6.3 8.1 7.5 6.8 5.8 4.6
RWCR banking sector % 10.7 10.5 11.8 12.5 12.5 13.0 13.2 13.8 14.4 13.7
Source Department of Statistics, Malaysia
recovered a total of RM30.4 billion, with a recovery
rate of 58 per cent of the NPLs acquired.
Altogether, the government’s financial restructuring
costs through the two SPVs, Danaharta and
Danamodal (a recapitalisation agency), amounted to
RM12.6 billion or 2.5 per cent of GDP. Banks
suffered losses of more than RM10 billion since they
had sold their NPLs at a discount. The total costs of
bank restructuring to the government and the banks
came to about RM23 billion or 5 per cent of GDP,
lower than the earlier estimate of 18 per cent of
GDP by the IMF.
Financial indicators, in general, point to a more
prudent management practice in banking
institutions. Credit growth was at a moderate rate of
8.6 per cent in 2005, an improvement from a
3.9 per cent growth in 2001 (Table 9), but slower
than the excessive double-digit pace in the pre-crisis
years. Loan growth for businesses increased by a
modest 3.0 per cent in 2005, due to a cautious
business climate and some excess capacity, but
household loans grew much faster at 15.1 per cent
(Bank Negara Malaysia, MSB). Individuals account for
54.5 per cent of outstanding bank loans, while
business enterprises had a share of 40.4 per cent in
2005. Lending activities are supported by sustained
economic growth and resilient demand from
businesses and households.
The loan quality of the banking sector improved
further in 2005 amid sustained economic growth.
The NPLs have declined to its lowest levels in 2005
since the Asian crisis, as noted earlier. The loan–loss
coverage of the banking system strengthened with
the fall in NPL levels and with the adoption of more
prudent provisioning policies in the banking sector.
The loan–loss coverage ratio of the banking system
improved to 59.2 per cent on a three-month basis in
2005, from 54.9 per cent in 2004. Capitalisation
levels in the banking system was sustained at healthy
levels in 2005, with the risk-weighted capital ratio
(RWCR) remaining at 13.1 per cent as at end-2005,
higher than the recommended 8.0 per cent by the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS). With the
inclusion of market risk in the risk-adjusted capital
framework, in addition to credit risk, capital positions
of the banking institutions are now more reflective
of various risks affecting the banking sector.
The banking sector landscape has changed
dramatically since the crisis. Mergers and acquisition
(M&A) among banks are encouraged, and most of the
M&As are largely market driven, with the central
bank overseeing the whole process. In early 2006,
there were ten domestic banking groups, compared
with more than 50 disparate financial institutions,
previously. All ten domestic banking groups have
completed the rationalisation exercise on schedule
before the expiration of the exemptions on stamp
duty and real property gains tax in January 2006. By
end-2006, the local banking group was down to nine
with more mergers. Investment banks emerged from
the rationalisation of merchant banks, stockbroking
firms and discount houses. The Financial Sector
Masterplan (FSMP) prefers liberalisation and
deregulation of the financial sector at a gradual phase
that will allow domestic banks to adequately prepare
for greater competition. Foreign equity ownership in
the conventional banking sector is still generally
restricted at 30 per cent. Foreign equity limit in
Islamic banks has been raised to 49 per cent to
encourage participation in this growth area. The
policy direction continues to focus on enhancing
structural and operational efficiencies of domestic
banks. The key suggestions are to increase investment
in human capital and promote a customer-oriented
culture to support the business models and services
which meet customers’ needs and demand. Much
emphasis has been directed at promoting sound risk
management practices and corporate governance
standards in the banking industry.
The private banks in Malaysia are mostly market-
driven and are highly profit oriented. However, to
encourage finance to areas that are less attractive
and more risky, such as agriculture and small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the government
has set up specialised banks to cater for these
sectors, categorised as Development Financial
Institutions (DFIs). The agriculture bank provides
financing to agriculture projects that can only
generate returns over the longer period. Apart from
loans, the SME bank gives additional business
advisory services to help SMEs apply better
management practices, expand their businesses, and
gain access to the export market.
Bank Negara continues to deregulate and liberalise
the banking sector at a gradual pace. Measures were
undertaken to promote efficiency and
competitiveness of the banking industry and to
strengthen the resilience of the financial system.
Banks were allowed to diversify their investment
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activities into unit trusts and derivatives up to a
certain limit. Locally incorporated foreign banks were
allowed to establish up to four additional branches
within a one year period, starting in 2006. Efforts
are also directed at strengthening the effectiveness
of surveillance to detect emerging vulnerabilities and
weaknesses that undermine financial stability. Bank
Negara has come up with some assessments
regarding the readiness of banking institutions for
Basel II. Four key principles are adopted by Bank
Negara as strategies to Basel II implementation (Bank
Negara Malaysia 2005). These are as follows:
1 Ensuring that risk management standards among
all banking institutions are improved over time.
2 Adoption of a more flexible timeframe that
allows for the implementation of capacity building
measures, recognising that domestic players are at
different levels of sophistication, thus more time
should be accorded to institutions intending to
adopt the more advanced approaches.
3 Implementation should not be based on
regulatory mandate. The adoption of advanced
approaches should be supported by strong
business justification.
4 Ensuring a more effective supervisory process for
the adoption of more advanced approaches. This
will be achieved through better supervisory
practices to assess internal models and advanced
risk management systems.
The adoption of Basel II in Malaysia is in line with the
overall direction of policy to promote higher
standards of risk management among the Malaysian
banks in facing greater competition from
liberalisation. However, there are challenges and
obstacles to overcome such as getting standardised
quality data from banking institutions. This will
require an internal set up that can capture the
required information.
Since the imposition of capital controls in 1998, which
has largely been relaxed over time, the Malaysian
currency, the ringgit, still does not have legal tender
outside the country. Therefore, the ringgit is still non-
internationalised and cannot be traded in offshore
markets. The reason for limiting the ringgit to the
domestic market was based on the experience during
the crisis when offshore trading in Singapore had
exacerbated speculative pressures on local financial
markets. Stock counters that were previously traded
in Singapore were also discontinued as a means to
contain external pressures.
Even after switching to a managed float regime in
July 2005, the ringgit was still not traded offshore.
In March 2007, Bank Negara relaxed some rules on
foreign exchange trading to enhance activity and
reduce transaction costs in the financial sector. The
limit on foreign exchange transactions for local banks
has been removed and limits on foreign currency
accounts were lifted. The central bank governor has
remarked that Malaysia will assess the benefits and
risks of ringgit internationalisation, and even
proposed partial liberalisation as an option. If
offshore ringgit trading is allowed, the currency will
be exposed to greater volatility and speculative risks,
and monetary policy could be rendered less effective.
On the positive side, allowing the market to
determine the ringgit’s value will bring it closer to its
equilibrium value, notwithstanding the occasional
overshooting. A more liberalised ringgit will improve
Malaysia’s image, which was tarnished by having
capital controls previously. Given the painful past
experience in 1998 and the recent speculative burst
on the Thai baht in late 2006, it is likely that Malaysia
will take a cautious stance on this issue. Even
without offshore ringgit trade, foreign inflows have
brightened up in early 2007 and the ringgit has
reached a 13-year high recently. Without clear
benefits more than offsetting the costs, this could
mean that offshore trading of the ringgit will come
later rather than sooner.
4 Capital flows/capital account
Private flows continue to feature significantly in the
capital account. However, due to the persistently
sizeable trade surpluses since 1998, the current
account continues to record surpluses which more
than compensate for occasionally large outflows of
private short-term funds. The merchandise balance
(or the goods balance) has been in surplus of more
than 20 per cent of GNP since 1998 (Table 7). This
has provided ample cushion against the more volatile
short-term flows. The recent large reversal in
portfolio investment flows was seen in late 2005,
when large speculative inflows of RM32.0 billion in
2004 were reversed to massive outflows of RM14.2
billion in 2005 when the ringgit did not appreciate
as anticipated by investors and financial markets did
not perform as well as expected.
Kadir The Malaysian Economy: Vulnerability to Crises68
The larger amount of foreign reserves will generally
give a sense of confidence that the country can
handle a larger amount of short-term outflows.
Relative to short-term external debt, the reserves
increased from 5.2 times of short-term external debt
in 1999 to 9.0 times in 2006. Another factor that has
reduced the risk of a capital-account led crisis is the
low share of short-term external debt relative to
total external debt, remaining at 23.6 per cent in
2005. Total external debt to GNP ratio stood at a
manageable 41.4 per cent in 2005. Moreover, the
external debt service ratio, measuring debt servicing
as a proportion of exports, has been declining from
6.5 per cent as at end-1998 to 4.7 per cent in 2006.
These related trends indicate that the risks of a
capital account-led crisis have been very much
reduced.
The financial account has been relaxed over time
following the implementation of capital controls in
1998. The restrictions on the outflow of local funds
have been relaxed further. Unit trust firms can now
invest up to 50 per cent of their local assets abroad
effective April 2007, up from 30 per cent previously.
There is less fear that outflows will impact on the
foreign reserves due to steady and sizeable export
earnings and FDI inflows. More positively, FDI flows
were not restricted during the capital control period
of the crisis and they remain free of restrictions to
move in and out of the country. It is foreseen that
Bank Negara will continue to deregulate the flows
of local funds to allow them to diversify their
investments and try to seek better returns in foreign
markets. This will come with some risks since local
fund managers are not familiar with foreign markets,
but the risks can be reduced by investing through
foreigners who are well-informed of their own
markets.
5 Vulnerabilities originating from internal
imbalances
The federal government fiscal deficit reached a high
of 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2000 (Table 10). At the
height of the crisis, the government embarked on a
counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus when the private
sector was badly affected. The expansionary fiscal
policy stayed on because the private sector needed
time to recover. The restructuring that took place in
the private sector resulted in decline in investment
activities. Flexibility in public spending is still needed
to support the economy due to the slow pace in
private sector recovery and the sometimes uncertain
external demand. The policy is for fiscal consolidation
to progress gradually, while maintaining a moderate
GDP growth pace. A somewhat worrying concern is
that Malaysia’s fiscal deficit is larger than that of its
neighbours such as Thailand and Indonesia, which
have been under stricter IMF conditions.
As far as policy is concerned, the reduction in fiscal
deficit will proceed at a pace that will not undermine
economic activity. The government will continue to
practice prudent financial management, giving more
focus to greater efficiency, effectiveness and
accountability in public spending. On the back of
strong private sector growth and higher oil-related
revenues, the active fiscal stimulus is not expected to
undermine the budget consolidation efforts. From a
high of 5.7 per cent of GDP in 2000, the fiscal deficit
of the government is expected to decline gradually to
3.5 per cent in 2006 and 3.4 per cent in 2007, a level
that will foster economic growth without imposing
strains on the government’s budget (Ministry of
Finance 2006). The 9th Malaysia Plan (9MP)
(Economic Planning Unit 2006) targets public
investment of about RM40 billion per year during
2006–2010, with the deficit to be contained at 3.4
per cent. A contentious point is how fiscal revenue
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Table 10 Federal government finance (% of GDP)
As % of GDP 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Revenue 23.0 23.3 20.0 19.5 18.0 23.8 23.1 23.4 22.1 21.5
Current expenditure 17.3 15.9 15.7 15.5 16.5 19.1 19.0 19.0 20.3 19.7
Net development expenditure 5.0 5.1 6.0 7.1 7.3 10.2 9.7 9.7 6.1 5.5
Overall surplus/deficit (–) 0.7 2.4 –1.8 –3.2 –5.7 –5.5 –5.6 –5.3 –4.3 –3.8
Source Ministry of Finance, Malaysia (2006/7).
will perform. Revenue from oil and gas takes a large
share of more than 20 per cent and if oil prices fall,
the revenue targets may not be met and this will
require adjustments in spending plans. An 18 per cent
hike in local oil prices in February 2006 was part of
the government’s effort to reduce its subsidy burden,
which is estimated to reach RM15 billion in 2006.
6 Policy suggestion to reduce vulnerabilities
The weak spots that beset the Malaysian economy
during the Asian crisis have shown improvements
after various measures were undertaken including the
banking sector reform and corporate restructuring
exercises. The fixed exchange rate regime was
dismantled in July 2005, and the ringgit is now under
managed floating based on a basket of currencies.
Capital controls have been relaxed over time and local
funds are allowed to move abroad, though only up to
a certain limit. The ban on ringgit offshore is likely to
stay for a while given the cautious stand of the
government in view of the volatility in regional
currencies. The uptrend in the stock market in early
2007, driven in part by greater foreign interests, has
simultaneously strengthened the ringgit as investors
try to profit from both the equity and currency
appreciation. The risks of sudden reversals have been
mitigated by the larger reserve position.
The GDP growth pace is now at a more moderate
level of around 5–6 per cent, reducing concerns of
overheating which was a main issue during the crisis.
The growth rate is more sustainable since it is close
to the estimated potential growth path of 6.0–6.5
per cent. Malaysia is unlikely to return to the rapid
growth pace of more than 9.0 per cent as in the
past, given the constantly changing and more
challenging global economic landscape. The
increasing global competition is making it more
difficult to attract FDI and expand the export
market. Moreover, the private sector is investing
more cautiously following the restructuring episode
after the crisis, and the fiscal deficit is a constraint on
government spending.
On the positive side, the current account has
continuously recorded surpluses since 1999, and this
has contributed to the increase in foreign reserves.
Although portfolio flows continue to have a
significant impact on the capital account of the BoP,
the large trade surplus helps cushion the outflows.
There are structural concerns over the heavy reliance
on electronics exports, thus exposing the Malaysian
economy to fluctuations in the electronics cycle. The
higher oil and gas prices and primary commodities,
such as palm oil and rubber, in 2006 have contributed
favourably to export revenue, partly acting as a buffer
to the changes in electronics demand.
The government is making efforts to diversify the
economy further by promoting sectors that have
growth potentials such as tourism, bio-tech and
Islamic financial services. More importantly, there is
greater focus on enhancing human capital with plans
to upgrade the quality of education at all levels and
to encourage constant retraining of workers. A high-
powered investment committee, comprising of
ministers and high-ranking officials, has been formed
to ensure timely approval of high-impact FDI
applications. An implementation agency has been set
up to make sure that public projects under the 9MP
proceed according to the planned timeframe.
In general, the financial sector has become more
resilient following the bank mergers and the
restructuring measures, including better risk
management practices being put in place. Loan
growth has moderated to a more sustainable level,
although bank loans are still the main source of
funding in the economy. The bond market is still
undergoing further development. The mergers have
reduced the number of banks in the system and their
capital-base is much larger than before, making
them more resilient to crisis. Asset quality has
improved, NPLs have been brought down and credit
systems have been improved.
Private consumption has been resilient so far, but it
may moderate in view of the increase in the living
costs arising from the cut in oil subsidy. The fiscal
stimulus can only offer a limited cushion to the
looming external weaknesses. As a note of caution,
there are downside risks to Malaysia’s growth
prospects. The precarious global imbalance, as
reflected by the huge and growing US current
account deficit, could force a major slide in the US
dollar. In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to a
downturn in the US economy and the spill over
effects can de-rail China’s growth momentum. The
softening demand in primary markets such as the
USA has partly been compensated by the expansion
in secondary markets involving intra-Asian trade.
Malaysia has grown less sensitive to the USA and
more sensitive to East Asia, especially China, in
recent times.
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